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To read Adorno as a negativist Aristotelian was always going to be controversial. It is, thus, 
unsurprising that the common critical concern running through the three reviews assembled 
here is the Aristotelianism I ascribe to Adorno. I am immensely grateful for these generous and 
thoughtful contributions, and in what follows I will try to do justice to the concerns they raise. 
I focus on the ascription of Aristotelianism as the major concern (section I), but I also discuss 
related and wider comments, regarding immanent critique (section II), negativism (section III), 
the role of social theory in Adorno’s work (section IV), and the danger of being co-opted 
(section V). Elsewhere, I have clarified the structure of the book and the aims of the different 
parts of it, and readers of this current reply might find it helpful to consult this other text first.1 
 
I: Aristotelianism 
In Adorno’s Practical Philosophy (APP), I argue that an Aristotelian conception of normativity 
is operative in Adorno’s theory. I do not claim that it is made explicit in his writings, but rather 
that we can unearth it from them, and that doing so is the best way to make sense of what he 
does say.  
Before entering into the details, let me flag up something about the strategy I employ 
in replying to my critics’ worries about Aristotelianism and about ascribing it to Adorno. I will 
repeatedly argue that what my critics present as Aristotelianism misdescribes it, and that the 
actual view held by Aristotelians (whether those traditionally understood as such or Adorno) 
does not suffer from the drawbacks my critics allege. Importantly, this is not a terminological 
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disagreement. While I think that it is most apt to reserve the term ‘Aristotelian’ for a certain 
cluster of positions, nothing, ultimately, hangs for me on that term. What does matter to me are 
both (a) interpretative questions (whether Adorno actually held the views I ascribe to him) and 
(b) substantive ones (whether these views are fruitful for understanding and responding to the 
world we face). In the following, I will show that at least some of the disagreement that exists, 
on both counts, between my critics and me, can be bridged. This comes with a risk of coming 
across as effacing the distinctiveness of the Aristotelian position. Thus, let me state it clearly 
upfront: even after removing certain wrong preconceptions about Aristotelianism, it remains a 
distinctive substantive approach with which many (including possibly Allen, Celikates, and 
O’Connor) would disagree, rightly or wrongly. By way of bookmarks for the discussion to 
come, let me highlight here four points:  
• indexing values (most notably the good and the bad) to the human life form (to 
humanity and inhumanity);  
• ethical objectivism (a rejection of subjectivism); 
• denying that ethics can be codified (and, hence, that it is or can be principle-based); and 
• a particular conception of rationality, whereby bodily reactions can be expressive of 
reason, sometimes more so than deliberate responses.   
This much by way of preamble. 
 
The Aristotelianism I ascribe to Adorno is unusual in a number of ways. First and 
foremost, it is unusual in being compatible with his (four-fold) negativism.2 Aristotelians 
usually start from the assumption that we know what the human good is and then develop 
ethical guidance on the basis of this knowledge. My Adorno would deny the assumption that 
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we know what the human good is (epistemic negativism), in good part because he thinks that 
we cannot escape the particular social context we are in and that social context realises what is 
bad for human beings (substantive negativism). However, ethical guidance is still available on 
the basis of our knowledge of what is bad for human beings (the other side of his epistemic 
negativism), and this knowledge is sufficient on its own, normatively speaking (meta-ethical 
negativism). O’Connor helpfully speaks of traditional Aristotelians as having a retrospective 
approach (p. 3): they look back at how the human good has already been realised and then try 
to emulate that again and again. (Unsurprisingly, O’Connor, thus, thinks of traditional 
Aristotelians as ‘conservative’.) My Adorno, according to O’Connor, is a prospective 
Aristotelian: he holds the thesis that humanity and thereby the human good have never been 
realised so far, and would only be realised in a possible future society freed off the bads of our 
social world (see APP, 137n15 for textual evidence that Adorno holds this view).  
Aristotelians would rightly be puzzled at this point. While Aristotle did not simply 
generalise his account of human nature from observing human beings as they happen to be, 
there is a relation to what they actually are like, not simply to what they could be. In the 
contemporary literature, Thompson has done more than anyone to investigate the complex 
relationship between Aristotelian claims about life forms and empirical observations.3 He 
suggests that Aristotelian claims about life forms are a sui generis kind of judgement, whereby 
they are not a simple generalisation of facts or capture what is statistically most frequent, but 
have a certain normative structure, such that a three-legged cat is a pathological case of a cat, 
even if by some accident the majority of cats in one generation would be born with three legs. 
Still, completely losing the mooring in what is the case with actual specimen would be to leave 
an Aristotelian approach firmly behind.  
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It is here that I would like to correct O’Connor’s characterisation of the Aristotelianism 
I ascribe to Adorno. It is not simply prospective, and if it were, then I think it would probably 
not make sense anymore to speak of Aristotelianism for the reason just sketched in the previous 
paragraph. Rather, my Adorno’s Aristotelianism is both retrospective and prospective – or to 
be more precise: for him, we can draw on the long history of domination and suffering to build 
up a pluralist conception of the bad (consulting, if you like, Benjamin’s angel of history about 
the storms of the past that propel him forward); but this retrospective work does not suffice to 
identify the human good, of which we can only speak prospectively as something yet to be 
realised and as such not something we can positively identify from where we are now. As part 
of this picture, it probably makes best sense to think of values along a tripartite distinction 
rather than a simple dualism of good and bad. In APP, I suggest such a tripartite distinction 
between (1) the bads, (2) the overcoming of the bads in basic (or minimal) human functioning, 
and (3) the good (APP, 216, 240f).4 
The second way in which Adorno’s Aristotelianism is unusual is that history plays a 
bigger and more fundamental role in his account than it tends to do in other Aristotelian 
accounts. One common picture – held by Allen and O’Connor alike – of how traditional 
Aristotelians think about the human good is that for them it is something that is metaphysically 
fixed for eternity. There may be some cultural and historical variation of how it is realised in 
detail (for example, promising as an institution is unavoidable for human beings, but the 
particular way this institution manifests itself will vary, such that different rituals will be 
involved in entering, accepting and releasing someone from a promise). Still, ultimately, our 
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badness, not a single category of badness. Speaking of ‘evils’ is a possibility and sometimes apt, but runs the 
danger to levelling all bad things to one intensity – and a particularly stark one at that.  
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human interests are fixed without history, and ethical objectivity is understood as 
transhistorical (to pick up on the way O’Connor’s and Allen’s express one of worries they have 
about my ascription of Aristotelianism to Adorno). I suspect that this common picture of 
traditional Aristotelianism is more of a caricature than a faithful portrait. But more importantly, 
the kind of Aristotelianism I ascribed to Adorno is anyway different from it. I probably do not 
emphasise this sufficiently in the book, where I only briefly raise this issue (APP, 252). As 
noted above, when it comes to the bads, Adorno’s Aristotelianism is deeply historical: history 
teaches us (or can do so, if we are attentive to it) what is bad for us qua human beings. And 
about our potential for the human good we also only know from the careful study of history 
and contemporary society, not from a metaphysics that swings free from history and sociology. 
Let me clarify this point. My proposal in the book is that Adorno’s theory, taken as a 
whole, is meant to be vindicated as the best explanation of our social world and the problems 
it contains. The theory is thereby understood as a web of ideas, concepts and evidence, in which 
the different elements are combined into a whole which stands and falls together. As part of 
this web there are, at least on my reading, some claims which could be described as broadly 
falling into philosophical anthropology (here I accept Allen’s characterisation of my position 
on p. 10 of her review). These are, for the most part, implicit commitments of Adorno’s theory, 
which can be unearthed by viewing his theory through the lens of Aristotelianism. However, 
there are not your common and garden variety of philosophical anthropology as ascribed to the 
commonly held picture of Aristotelianism. Why not? For at least two reasons.  
First, they are, in a certain sense and in a particular regard, more formal than the 
common picture of Aristotelianism: on Adorno’s view, we have substantive knowledge of what 
is bad for human beings, but this substantive knowledge does not suffice to yield what living 
well for human beings would consist in. We only know that living well does definitely not 
consist in being subject to the variety of bads that (Adorno thinks) we are, systematically 
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subject to in this social world. This radically underdetermines the human good. As noted in the 
book (APP, Ch. 8, Section II), we can have a rich historical understanding of the events for 
which the name ‘Auschwitz’ symbolically stands and this rich historical understanding yields 
some knowledge about what it is not to live well, whatever living well will include (the final 
clause is what makes my account more formal than typical Aristotelian ones).5 This rich 
historical understanding will also give us some guidance on what repeating Auschwitz would 
consist in, but even this knowledge and guidance will underdetermine what it would take to 
live in a society where genuine realisation of the human potential is possible and where we 
would then know what the human good is. There can be societies and social worlds which 
would prevent a repeat of Auschwitz, but still fall short of allowing individuals to develop and 
realise the human good. And the same is true, even if we simply combined all the various bads 
of which we have this historically rich understanding. Their combination will tell us at most 
about basic human functioning, that is, that which is required as a minimum condition for living 
well whatever living well actually amounts to.  
Second, the various claims (about what is bad for human beings, about what is required 
for their basic functioning, and that humanity is an unrealised potential) are embedded in a 
theory that aims to make best sense of a particular historical social world. They are not derived 
or posited independently from such a historically informed theory, but part and parcel of it. In 
the book, I, thus, speak of the anthropological commitments as postulates. There is an analogy 
here with Kant’s postulates of pure practical reason, but only in a restricted sense. The 
commitments in question are not, strictly speaking, transcendental conditions – in that respect 
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they are different from what Kant intended the postulates of pure practical reason to be. Still 
the latter could not stand on their own, but depend on the wider theory of which they are part. 
Whatever warrant we have for them is indirect and derivative – there are something that has to 
be true, if the other elements of the theory, which Kant aims to demonstrate more directly, are 
true. In this restricted sense, an analogy holds.  
In sum, ascribing Aristotelianism to Adorno is compatible both with his negativism and 
with his deeply historical outlook. The latter is what both O’Connor and Allen, and more 
implicitly Celikates, worry is ruled out, but hopefully the above goes some way to answer their 
concerns. Put differently, negative Aristotelianism and Hegelian historicism need not be seen 
as alternatives (contrary to what Allen says on p. 10). Indeed, my notion of Aristotelianism is 
deliberately broad, so as to include not just Adorno, but also Hegel and Marx. An old tutor of 
mine used to say of Hegel that he is ‘Aristotle on wheels’ to indicate how Aristotelianism could 
be combined with a deeply historical approach.  
Beyond the general worry about how Aristotelianism is compatible with Adorno’s 
historical approach, the three reviewers also air specific worries about the Aristotelianism 
which I ascribe to Adorno. Let me discuss the main ones in turn. 
One parallel I draw between Aristotelianism and Adorno’s theory is objectivism, 
specifically ethical objectivism. The key thought here is that one can be in error in one’s ethical 
judgements. These judgements may express perfectly one’s sentiments, but still be wrong, 
because the sentiments are not sufficiently attuned to what a situation ethically requires. (And 
the same holds for other subjectivist accounts, not just those who index morality to the 
sentiments.) The logic of Adorno’s position requires such objectivism. For him to be able to 
say that many of us most of the time and the remainder some of the time are mistaken in what 
they think and do (in part because of ideological influences on us), he needs to subscribe to a 
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form of ethical objectivism.6 In addition, I think that Adorno, at least on occasion, explicitly 
endorses objectivism. 
Allen objects to the latter point by criticising my reading of a passage in which Adorno 
speaks about objectivity. He speaks about objectivity, Allen notes, only in ‘square quotes’ (p. 
9, in reference to APP, 197), and we should read him as advancing an interpretation ‘to 
illuminate heretofore unilluminated segments of social reality’, rather than as saying that reality 
makes demands on us directly (p. 9). Later, she then adds that even when Adorno says that 
‘what the inhuman is we know very well indeed’, he is not speaking about the absolute inhuman 
and, as such, something objective, but something ‘concrete, historically situated’ (p. 12). 
In reply, I begin with Adorno’s texts and statements. It is true, that Adorno uses scare 
quotes when he speaks of ‘objectively’ in his exchange with Popper, but he is less guarded in 
writing and talking about objectivity on other occasions. One notable example is in Negative 
Dialektik, when he appeals to ‘objective truth’ in the context of discussing ideological 
distortions.7 Moreover, in the exchange with Popper he describes values as, originally, 
‘question-forms of reality’ (quoted in APP, 197 and Allen, p. 9). It seems, thus, not inapt to 
say that for Adorno the world as it actually is gives rise to ethical demands on us. This connects 
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 In this context, let me briefly correct one misunderstanding about the third Adornian constraint on any account 
of normativity. This third constraint is not, as Allen has it (p. 12), supporting an error theory about morality (in 
the way J.L. Mackie famously did). Rather, it is about ascribing error, including moral error, to many of us most 
of the time and some of us part of the time, in the context of where there is objective truth about ethics. It is not 
that there is no moral truth to be known, but, rather, it is the case that we sometimes get such truth wrong – and 
often not just accidentally so, but because of the way our social world is.    
7
 Adorno 1966: 198/1973: 198. Another example is a radio discussion with Gehlen, where Adorno speaks of 
‘objective happiness’ and ‘objective misery’, but qua oral comment it is difficult to ascertain whether his use of 
‘objective’ is here less qualified than the use of scare quotes in the exchange with Popper suggests it is there 
(Adorno and Gehlen 1983: 250). 
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to an important phenomenon: our feeling that our actual situation demands something of us, 
rather than that we merely interpret it as issuing such demands. The textual grounds on absolute 
inhumanity are even stronger: Adorno notes repeatedly that the catastrophe has already 
happened (see APP, p 158n68) and speaks of Nazism as ‘absolute evil [Böse]’.8 It might be an 
interesting philosophical question, how we can form an absolute judgement on the basis of a 
historical experience, but this idea of a contingently arisen necessity is clearly what Adorno 
intends (consider also his new categorical imperative as arising from a historical context9).  
What I think misleads Allen is assuming that, for objectivists, interpretation (or human 
responses generally) have no direct or primary importance whatsoever. But this is to assume 
wrongly in relation to Aristotelian objectivism. For example, in McDowell’s well-known 
variant, ethical properties are understood in parallel to colour judgements.10 They are objective 
in the sense that one can be wrong about the colours of an object, but this does not mean that 
the reactions of perceivers in general are completely secondary or incidental to what colours 
are. Not every response captures them adequately, but unless there were some perceiver who 
could capture them adequately, then (on this view) it would not make sense to speak of colours. 
Mutatis mutandis with ethical properties. Moreover, this does not mean that we should give up 
on the notion of objectivity. On the contrary, we should free this notion from an absolute 
conception of reality, as there is no way we can make sense of such an absolute conception 
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 McDowell 1998: Chapters 6-7. To forestall misunderstanding: in drawing some specific parallels between 
Adorno and McDowell, I am not suggesting that they hold the same view in all respects. My point is rather one 
about a certain family resemblance (if I may be allowed to extend this notion to talk about philosophical 
positions, not just ordinary notions like ‘game’). Among other differences, McDowell seems to think immanent 
critique of a certain sort suffices as critical purchase, whereas Adorno is skeptical of this (see II below and 
Freyenhagen 2013b).  
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(something about which McDowell and Adorno agree). This means, objectivity need not 
(indeed, cannot) be thought of as antithetical to interpretation and human responses.     
This leads me to the second specific parallel between Aristotelianism generally and 
Adorno’s view in particular that is relevant here. In both cases, I submit, the problem as to how 
we identify what the adequate response to an objective ethical demand is, consists not in a 
principle, but in the judgements of certain people, the phronimoi. The difference is that for 
traditional Aristotelians, phronimoi are virtuous agents, whereas for Adorno no one can be 
fully virtuous in our current (damaged) social world. For Adorno, critical individuals have a 
similar function to the virtuous agents in other forms of Aristotelianism, but without being fully 
virtuous. They function as a reference point and take the place that principles have in Kantian 
ethics or Utilitarianism.  
Both O’Connor and Celikates object to my ascribing a phronimoi account to Adorno. 
For O’Connor, such an account is insufficiently reflective, as for Adorno ‘[e]very urge and 
intuition we have must be measured against a principle’ (p. 15). Celikates accepts that 
appealing to insights of a few critical individuals is an aspect of Adorno’s understanding of 
social critique, but that I ‘risk painting a one-sided picture’ by ‘disembedding this feature from 
its wider social-theoretical context’ (p. 9). He also thinks that this feature of Adorno’s thought 
is problematic, as it reduces the pool of potential critics to the lucky and privileged (pp. 9f). 
I will return to Adorno’s social theory below (section IV) and thereby to Celikates’ 
disembedding criticism. For now, I note several other points. Phronimoi need not be thought 
of as unreflective. The main insight is, rather, that there is no standard independent of what the 
best judges judge to be the case; no independent standard by which to evaluate their and our 
judgements; and also no principle which codifies their judgements. The ultimate authority of 
reflection is not the principle of pure reason, but the not fully codifiable judgement of those 
must attuned to the situation and most reflective about it. That this is Adorno’s view can be 
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attested both by reminding the reader of the criticisms of principles (see APP, Chapters 4-5) 
and by passages such as the following: 
The only thing that can perhaps be said is that the right way of living today would consist in resistance 
to the forms of the wrong life that have been seen through and critically dissected by the most progressive 
minds.11  
In some cases, there will be a certain kind of immediacy to the phronimoi’s judgement (I come 
back to the sense of immediacy below). But this will not always be so and need not be so. 
Indeed, sometimes critical dissecting by the most progressive minds will require the full works 
of a critical social theory. The key thought is that reflectiveness need not be principle-driven. 
Indeed, if Adorno and other Aristotelians are correct, then it could not be principle-driven at 
least in certain areas of enquiry (such as ethics), as these areas cannot be fully codified, but 
require a different kind of reflectiveness. (Indeed, if this is so, we should not even attempt to 
uncover the purported governing principles of these areas.) 
There is much more to be said about this, but for our purposes now, the following will 
need to suffice. One can accept that a phronimoi account of ethics is the most suitable way to 
go, without thereby subscribing to an elitism and authoritarianism. Nothing in the idea of 
phronimoi excludes that everyone could acquire the excellency in question. Indeed, Adorno is 
adamant that in the right social context, everybody would acquire it (this comes out well in his 
discussion with Gehlen, who does not share this democratic vision of the phronimoi account; 
see also APP, 249). Adorno’s point is rather that in the wrong social world, it will likely only 
be the lucky and privileged that can acquire something of the excellency in question. He might 
have been wrong about this or at least too restrictive in his vision of what is required to become 
a critical individual in his sense (a sheltered, bourgeois upbringing in high European culture). 
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But in interpreting an author, charity is not the only virtue; fidelity to what he does say and to 
the logic of his position is also required. A position like the one Celikates recommends might 
still be Adornian in relaxing some of the strictures of how critical individuals might develop, 
but this would require that Celikates holds on to a philosophical aspect of Adorno’s theory 
(what I have loosely been calling ‘the phronimoi account’) and – ironically, given Celikates’ 
insistence on social theory – that he makes this philosophical aspect more central than some of 
Adorno’s claims about the social context.  
O’Connor’s objection to my ascription of a phronimoi account to Adorno is part of a 
broader worry. O’Connor picks up on how Adorno physical impulses play a crucial role in the 
remnants of ethical agency (something I emphasise, see APP, Chapter 5, 7, 9, and Appendix). 
O’Connor understands these impulses as brute aversions. It is, he contends, only such aversions 
that phronimoi could be guided by (on my reconstruction), but these aversions, he thinks, do 
not suffice to navigate our ethical challenges. Indeed, even something extreme as torture could 
not be tackled simply on the basis of the brute aversion to pain, since torture’s ‘wrongs go 
beyond what we can infer from animal aversion’ (p. 7). At its worst, my talk of ‘untutored’ 
physical impulses (APP, 250) also violates ‘a core claim of Adorno’s general philosophical 
position: the mediation thesis’ (p. 12). This comes close to Allen’s worry about unqualified 
objectivism – again, mediation by human judgement is being insisted upon.  
I think this objection overlooks an important aspect of Aristotelianism, which I also 
identify as present in Adorno’s theory. The Aristotelian conception of reason is broader than 
what is being deliberately done for reasons. Notably, a body reflex can be rational for 
Aristotelians despite the fact that no deliberation has gone into it, not even initially, before it 
was formed. Thus, Aristotelians can view my bodily reflexes – such as when I instinctively 
retreat from something so hot it would burn me – as expressive of objective reasons. As 
member of an animal species, I have objective reason, at least other things being equal, to avoid 
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being burnt. The fact that I withdraw my hand instinctively does not deduct anything from the 
reasonableness of the response; nor does the fact that I could not have prevented myself from 
doing so. In fact, a non-human animals’ withdrawal from fire is also embodying objective 
reason, even if one stipulated that in their case deliberation is not possible at all. Moreover, on 
the Aristotelian view, it is possible that a bodily reaction is not just expressive of the objective 
reason we have, but might be better at capturing these reasons than our deliberative responses 
do (see APP, Ch. 7). These deliberative responses might be so infected by ideology that they 
are worse guides to what we should do than our reflexes and physical impulses, which may be 
more recalcitrant to being infected in this way. Still, in one sense even these bodily reactions 
are not completely independent from judgement by ethical agents: such agents can recognise 
(and indeed ought to recognise) such a reflex as expressive of the reasons we have. In sum, 
reasons need not feature consciously to be present, and their relation to judgement can be fairly 
indirect.  
Moreover, reason-expressive reflexes or physical impulses are not brute givens, 
completely unmediated by anything. As I stress in the book (APP, 48n64, 241, and 250), they 
are mediated with our interests as the specific life form we are. Indeed, they are also historically 
mediated: our life form itself has a complex natural history, and our reflexes and other physical 
impulses are its product. Adorno takes a leaf our out Freud’s book here. Freud writes: 
The experiences of the ego seem at first to be lost for inheritance; but, when they have been repeated 
often enough and with sufficient strength in many individuals in successive generations, they transform 
themselves, so to say, into experiences of the id, the impressions of which are preserved by heredity. 
Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are harboured residues of the existence of countless 
egos.12 
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If Adorno follows Freud in this view, we might then say that the physical impulses – notably 
the physical abhorrence to suffering – are the sedimented layers inherited by each human being 
from a long natural history, in which human experiences of and resistance to suffering played 
a major role. The impulses may be ‘untutored’ in the sense of being untouched by our formation 
in modern society (i.e., what is for Adorno the wrong social world), but they are not thereby 
simply immediate and brute givens.  
It seems to me that O’Connor does not see this because he assumes a too cognitivist 
notion of mediation: mediation has to be by way of concepts, it has to involve conscious 
judgement, and it has to, ultimately, relate to principles (he explicitly expresses the latter on p. 
15). But this both begs the question against Aristotelianism and sits uneasily with Adorno’s 
texts, which, as O’Connor does not deny, give physical impulses, not principles, an important 
place in ethical practice. (On the new categorical imperative as not a principle in O’Connor’s 
sense, see APP, Chapter 5 and 7). 
O’Connor, ultimately, rejects my ascription of Aristotelianism to Adorno also for 
another reason, albeit this is never explicitly stated as such: he suggests that it imposes a 
systematicity that is alien to Adorno’s works, which Adorno conceives, after all, as constituting 
an ‘anti-system’, in the way we speak of anti-heroes in novels and films.13 This objection seems 
to me problematic for two reasons. First, Adorno always insisted that his rejection of first-
philosophy and deductively organised philosophical systems is not the same as an embrace of 
inconsistency and an abandonment of rigour (I discuss this in APP, 18-20). Systematicity is 
not alien to Adorno’s anti-system. Instead, it is present in a number of ways, such as the striking 
consistency with which he advances his position from his inaugural lecture in 1931 until his 
death in 1969, or the careful construction of texts. Aristotelianism, also, offers systematicity 
                                                      
13
 Adorno 1966: 10/1973: ix-xx. 
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without system. It provides Adorno’s position with the kind of coherence that he would have 
accepted: not one that involves a first principle from which everything is derived, but one in 
which inconsistencies are avoided and everything fits together into a whole, against which 
certain moves (like the rejection of discursive grounding or the emphasise placed on physical 
impulses) make sense. Second, O’Connor’s own concern about how my reading fits with 
Adorno’s mediation thesis suggests that he, at one level, also accepts that Adorno was in the 
business of systematicity and coherences of a certain sort.  
It is difficult to emphasise enough the holism of Adorno’s position. In the very passage, 
when I write about ‘untutored physical impulses’ (APP, 250), I continue by saying that this 
element should be seen as part of a theory that as a whole presents itself for our assent as the 
best explanation of our social world and its problems. I think we misunderstand this whole if 
we do not recognise it for its strongly Aristotelian character – perhaps because we are misled 
by a too narrow conception of Aristotelianism according to which it is necessarily ahistorical 
and objective in a way completely severed from human judgements and history. Aristotelian 
philosophical anthropology could not be an independent foundation for Adorno – nothing could 
be that – but as an integral part of an overall whole, it has its place.    
 
II: Immanent Critique 
Both Allen and Celikates seek clarification regarding immanent critique. In the book, I argue 
that immanent critique plays a role in Adorno’s theory, but does not suffice on its own for his 
critique of modern society and its thought forms. In the book, I sketch briefly some 
considerations for why this is so and also offer textual grounds (APP, 13-15).  
Immanent critique is traditionally contrasted with external critique, whereby the critical 
standards brought to bear on an object of critique transcend it. If the object of critique is the 
whole social world and its thought forms (as is the case with Adorno), then the standard of 
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critique would have to be external to that world and these forms. Adorno clearly rejects such 
external critique on the basis of transcendent standards as impossible (here I find myself in full 
agreement with Allen). Does this mean that in rejecting immanent critique, I settled Adorno 
with something he rejects? Allen suggests that the opposition between immanent and external 
critique is not exhaustive, and seeks clarification which of the third alternatives I ascribe to 
Adorno. She offers two options: ‘immanent transcendence’, whereby we appeal to something 
outside of the social world and its thought forms (the ‘non-identical’ is, on Allen’s 
interpretation the label for that something outside), but without expressing it directly (as this 
would infect it by the bad immanence), and ‘immanent negativism’, where ‘the bads and 
wrongs that are invoked in critique are themselves negative ideals or value that are found within 
the existing social world, rather than putatively objective or transcendent bads or wrongs’ (p. 
7). Allen favours the former, but I think a somewhat modified version of the latter is Adorno’s 
view (and I thank her for the opportunity to clarify that this was all along the view expounded 
in my book). 
Let me explicate what I have in mind. As Allen notes, towards the end of the book I 
state that the conception of the bad I ascribe to Adorno ‘is not a transcendent standard but – to 
use a formulation by Horkheimer – “grounded on the misery off the present”’ (APP, 244). The 
thought is that the multiple badness of our social world gives rise to a manifold of negative 
experiences. The origin of these negative experiences and even their negativity is not always 
transparent to us, but requires disclosure. Moreover, the negativity in question may not be well-
captured by the accepted negative ideals and values, for the latter might be inflected by 
ideological distortion in various ways. Nonetheless, it is the negative experiences that provide 
us with the impetus and orientation for a critical theory of society. Making them visible depends 
in part on the disclosing power of critical theory, but this does not take away that they provide 
it with its critical orientation. Elsewhere I have described this position as a form of internal 
 - 17 -
critique: neither immanent critique in the traditional sense (because it does not take the 
accepted values and ideals as given, not even the negative ones), nor transcendent (for it does 
not rely on access to something beyond this social world and its thought forms).14        
This seems to me to fit Adorno’s position better than immanent transcendence. Note 
first an ambiguity in Allen’s description of this position: she says first that Adorno ‘need not – 
and, in my view, does not – claim to have access to this outside in order for this idea to do 
critical work’ (pp. 5-6), but then continues that it is a particular kind of access (direct access 
via subsumption) that is the problem, not expressing it indirectly through the fragmentary 
character of essays. Presumably even indirect expression involves some form of access (for 
otherwise how would it be expressive of the something outside in question?), so she either 
cannot mean that we need not claim to have access to something outside or she has to accept 
that that we cannot express it after all. Either way, the position is unsustainable. I also think 
that he does not conceive of the non-identical as something outside of our social world and its 
thought forms. Yes, it is not fully captured by these thought forms; yes, there is something that 
is done violence to; and yes, in a different social world with different thought forms, this 
violence could be avoided (or at least minimised). But this does not mean that what is not 
captured fully and what is violated is outside of this social world; or that what it would mean 
not to do violence to it can be anticipated here and now. On the latter point, consider a well-
known passage from Negative Dialektik: ‘In the right condition everything would be, as in the 
Jewish theologoumenon, only the slightest bit different than what it is, but not the slightest 
thing can be imagined, as how it would then be’.15 
                                                      
14
 Freyenhagen 2012. 
15
 Adorno 1966: 294/1973: 299; translation amended; my emphasis. 
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Celikates also calls for ‘further elaboration’ when it comes to the rejection of immanent 
critique (p. 4). The above reply to Allen hopefully provides this elaboration already, but let me 
pick up on two specific points.  
First, Celikates might well be right in insisting – in a way reminiscent of Bernard 
Williams – that there are ‘certain values or ideals that are constitutive for our self-
understanding and that we could not simply give up’. In relation to such values and ideals, 
immanent critique has clear mileage. I happily accept that. What, in the book, I was reporting 
on about Adorno’s rejection of immanent critique concerns, however, ideals and values that, it 
turns out, are not constitutive, despite initial appearances. In particular, Adorno comments on 
the social self-understanding(s) found in legitimising discourse. He thinks that capitalist 
modernity at some point did without supporting legitimising discourse altogether. This means 
the values and ideals utilised in this discourse turned out to be non-constitutive (capitalist 
modernity could persist without them). Crucially, it also means that it is no longer possible to 
criticise it for failing to realise the ideals and values of this legitimising discourse. Adorno 
might be factually wrong about the disappearance of legitimising discourse. Still, insofar as he 
was right about this disappearance, one can see why immanent social critique would no longer 
be applicable in such a context. In other words, in the book I was not so much reporting about 
a general argument against immanent critique per se, as about Adorno’s specific contextualist 
judgement about a particular socio-historical setting. Even in this setting, Adorno saw 
structural contradictions at play – on this Celikates and I are in agreement. However, my point 
was that these structural contradictions require our bringing to bear the negativist, Aristotelian 
orientation that I highlight in the book, rather than simply exposing capitalist modernity for not 
living up to its own promise. This orientation is internal (it arises from and expresses negative 
experiences and misery), but it is not immanent in the sense that is or has to be part of the 
reigning legitimising discourse.  
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Second, this also means that Celikates and I hold largely overlapping positions, albeit 
with one key difference that remains. The overlap is obscured because our different use of the 
terms involved: in effect, Celikates calls ‘internal critique’ what I call ‘immanent critique’. He 
agrees that merely looking to the standard people already accept is insufficient. Instead, what 
is required, according to him (and others like Jaeggi), is ‘…to extract the normative resources 
for critique from the (often implicit) normative structure of those practices and self-
understandings that are constitutive for the (type of) society in question …’ (p. 5; my emphasis). 
This is what he calls ‘immanent critique’. My ‘internal critique’ differs from it insofar as the 
misery and negative experiences internal to the current social world, which it takes as its 
(negative) orientation, provide normative structure that could point beyond what is constitutive 
for this social world, not merely to a better realisation of its constitutive structure. Moreover, 
let me also note a point located at a different level: the main purpose of the discussion of 
immanent critique in the Introduction of APP is to reveal that Adorno cannot rely on such 
critique alone – as long as that premise is granted, then the dialectic can be pressed further in 
the way I suggested. Celikates accepts that Adorno does not exclusively rely on either what he 
calls immanent and internal critique, noting of even his preferred option that few would ‘claim 
that it is applicable under all circumstances, including National Socialism’ (p. 5). Again, one 
might not accept Adorno’s claim that we are in circumstances where what is constitutive for 
our social world does not suffice for capturing what is wrong and bad about it, but among the 
various things that make Adorno’s theory interesting and challenging is that he is trying to 
think through what our critical resources are in such circumstances.16 In sum, again my point 
was not to provide a general argument against immanent critique per se, but to explicate the 
implications of Adorno’s contextualist judgement about a particular socio-historical setting.  
                                                      
16
 See also Freyenhagen 2013b for an attempt to grapple with this challenge. 
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III: Negativism 
One aspect of O’Connor’s line of objection I have not picked up on yet is his claim that torture’s 
‘wrongs go beyond what we can infer from animal aversion’ (p. 7) and that an adequate account 
of it requires knowledge of the good. This is part of a wider worry (or, rather, set of worries) 
O’Connor airs about (metaethical) negativism. As much as physical agony is bad for us and 
part of what makes torture wrong, not all that is bad is reducible to the bad of physical agony. 
At the same time, physical agony is not always bad – it depends on the context and individual. 
Even ‘severe pain’ is present ‘in many voluntary and fulfilling undertakings’ (p. 6). Moreover, 
if we really were marked by a lack of basic human functioning, then we would not experience 
humiliation or the loss of this basic human functioning (p. 8). Insofar as we do notice the way 
our irreplaceable uniqueness is being jeopardised, this suggests that our humanity and the good 
are not just there as potential, but ‘to some degree actualized’ (p. 9). 
 In reply, let me begin by a clarification. In the chapter in which I defend metaethical 
negativism (APP, Ch. 8), I use physical agony repeatedly as an example. This has a certain 
dialectical point: my sense is that the default position is so stacked against negativism that only 
some stark and relatively simple examples will make people see that the matter is more 
complicated. Put differently, these examples serve the point of getting the foot in the door for 
negativism. They are not meant to be exhaustive of negativism or even representative of the 
complex, multi-dimensional forms of negativism that its proponents normally hold. They are 
meant to provide an opening for such forms, so that they can get a fair hearing. That is all. 
Crucially, this does not mean that Adorno’s negativism is about only the badness of 
physical agony. For him such agony is all too easy brushed aside or overlooked. Also, he thinks 
often physical pain is how other forms of suffering reveal themselves – while Adorno never 
says so in these terms, he, in effect, subscribes to what we would nowadays call psychosomatic 
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disorders. But, ultimately, he holds a multi-dimensional conception of the bad, in which 
physical agony is just one dimension (APP, Ch. 5, especially 144-9, and 245-6). Hence, my use 
of the plural ‘bads’. Equipped with a multi-dimensional conception of the bad, we can, I would 
maintain, explicate the evils involved in torture without falling into a problematically reductive 
account or requiring knowledge of the good. In fact, contrary to O’Connor, I would argue that 
knowledge of the good requires knowledge of bads and wrongs: it is by our exposure to the 
latter that we might eventually come to know what the good and the right are – just consider 
how pivotal examples like torture or slavery are as baselines in how people argue for their 
conception of justice or the good. But I do accept that explicating what goes wrong when people 
are tortured involves a multi-dimensional conception of the bad. Indeed, I would even accept 
that prior to knowing what the good is, we might not be able to explicate what is wrong with 
torture in full. But then even explicating some of its problematic aspects will suffice for ethical 
guidance in most cases (and can avoid being problematically reductive).   
When I discuss what explicating the evils of Auschwitz would consist in for Adorno, I 
highlight that these evils went beyond physical agony (APP, 245-6). It is by such explication 
that we can learn about some of the elements of basic human flourishing – that we learn that, 
whatever the human good is, we need at least a minimal sense of being agents with a specific 
life history and attachments and projects. (Here again, we encounter the sense in which the 
Aristotelianism I am ascribing has a formal element to it; see already section I above.) 
Depriving us of even this minimal sense is to deny us the conditions for functioning as human 
beings at all. O’Connor is right that in being so deprived, we are unlikely to experience the 
humiliation and loss of basic human functioning. But this is not an objection to what my 
Adorno says. Just the opposite, it captures what Primo Levi has described as ‘the drowned’ and 
was referred to as ‘Muselmänner’ in the slang term used among captives of Nazi concentration 
and extermination camps. The drowned could not bear witness to the loss of basic human 
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functioning – others, like Levi, had to do it for them. But this makes it no less the case that 
basic human functioning in Adorno’s sense was what they were being robbed off.  
In addition, I also note that the thesis I ascribe to Adorno about physical agony is not a 
total exclusion of it. Rather, the thesis is that physical agony always gives us a prima facie 
reason and sometimes gives us an all-things-considered reason to avoid it (see also APP, 144-
9 and 211-3). For example, my Adorno does not deny that it might well be that the agony of 
going to the dentist now is something that all-things-considered is the less bad path to take than 
the agony that would follow otherwise. Also, physical agony might be accepted to avoid 
another bad or evil in some context – for example, a member of the French Resistance who did 
not reveal names to his Nazi torturers is acting admirably, including for Adorno, despite the 
fact that this results in prolongation and intensification of physical agony. Once more, what 
Adorno warns about is that our modern civilisation is all too ready to accept physical pain in 
exchange for some promised good to come at some future point, which (a) often never 
materialises and (b) might not be worth the trade-off. This does not mean that we should never 
make or accept such trade-offs. It does mean, however, that Adorno would be more suspicious 
than O’Connor is to accept that the ‘many voluntary and fulfilling undertakings’ involving 
severe pain are genuinely voluntary and fulfilling.  
Finally, let me say something briefly about whether humanity or the good is not just 
something that might become realised in a different social world, but already, in part, actualised 
in the here and now. Importantly, Adorno is not denying that we always have our basic human 
functioning denied in our social world, although he thinks it always includes the objective 
tendency towards such a denial. He is also not denying that there will be some positive 
experiences, like having a pleasurable meal or encounter with others. What Adorno does claim 
is that humanity has not been realised (as discussed in APP, 11-2 and 237-9), and that we do 
not really encounter happiness, as distinct from fleeting pleasures, in this social world. As he 
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puts it in Negative Dialektik: ‘To this day, all happiness is a pledge of what has not yet been, 
and the belief in its imminence obstructs its becoming’.17 These are controversial claims, and 
I do not pretend that I have conclusively established in the book that Adorno is right about 
them. What I have tried to do in the book is to show that there are no convincing philosophical 
grounds for thinking that he is wrong. Specifically, in defending metaethical negativism, my 
aim was to show that his position could be true. Whether or not, ultimately, it is, requires 
renewing and then evaluating his research programme. On this programme and its results the 
jury is very much out – but the objective of the book was “merely” that the programme is not 
dismissed out of court from the start.  
 
IV: Social Theory 
Celikates’s second and ‘main worry’ (p. 9) is that my interpretation downplays the social-
theoretical dimensions of Adorno’s work at the expense of the ethical one. I will leave aside 
here whether the German ‘Übel’ is better translated as ‘evil’ or as bad’ – in either case, the 
language is strongly evaluative. The real question is whether my reading of Adorno underplays 
the embedding of such language in his social theory.  
It will be useful to start with a clarification. Celikates picks up on something important 
to my book, namely, that it aims to prepare the philosophical ground for Adorno’s 
interdisciplinary research programme, not yet carry that programme out (APP, 22f, 253f; 
referred to by Celikates on pp. 6 and 10). What I mean with this is the following. One key 
question for a book (or article) is its context of reception – what is the dominant picture in the 
existing literature and will the book (or article) reinforce it or try to dislodge it. In my view, 
the still dominant picture of Adorno’s work is one according to which his theory is lacking 
                                                      
17
 Adorno 1966: 346/1973: 352; my emphasis. 
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normative foundations (Allen captures the picture well in her opening pages). In particular, I 
think this dominant picture gets in the way of evaluating Adorno’s research programme on its 
merits – it forecloses such evaluation already at the get-go. One of the main aims of my book 
was to dislodge this picture and open up again a view on that research programme – this is 
what I meant with ‘preparing the philosophical ground’ for it. By showing that the insistence 
on normative foundations is problematic and that critics overlook the viability of metaethical 
negativism, I hoped to clear the ground of philosophical prejudice against Adorno’s research 
programme.  
Importantly, what I did not mean by talking of ‘preparing the philosophical ground’ is 
for Adorno’s ethics or practical philosophy to ground his social theory. While Celikates never 
actually says this, I wonder whether he suspects me of having wanted to suggest such an ethical 
grounding of social theory. Understandably, he is critical of that endeavour. To be clear: such 
a grounding project is not what I have intended or offered in the book. I am in agreement with 
Celikates that this would not capture Adorno’s intention. However, I worry that Celikates 
overshoots in the other direction – some of this formulations (particular his talk of social theory 
as ‘a precondition of the kind of negativist and minimalist ethics that Freyenhagen develops’ 
(p. 8)) suggest that Adorno’s social theory is presented as the foundation for his ethics. That 
strikes me as wrong too. Instead, as already indicated in section I, Adorno is best read, I submit, 
as presenting a web of elements in which none has a foundational role, but all are 
interdependent. Indeed, to suggest that Adorno’s social theory is somehow prior to his ethics 
is to suggest that Adorno subscribes to something much more resembling traditional theory (in 
Horkheimer’s seminal sense) than critical theory. It would be to ascribe to him the kind of 
value-free social theory he always rejected, and upon which is then later added an ethics 
separate from social theory (a division which he also always rejected). Instead, Adorno, like 
Horkheimer, has a partisan conception of theory and theorising, in which a particular ethical 
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orientation is constitutive of the theoretical endeavour – not separate from it; not its 
independent basis; and not derived from social theory either.18   
The nub of the disagreement, however, is again the Aristotelianism I ascribe to Adorno. 
Celikates thinks that Aristotelianism is difficult to reconcile with Adorno’s commitment to a 
materialist and critical social theory (p. 8), rather than (as I presented it in the book and again 
in section I) seeing them as tied together. Where I see similarities between widely recognised 
Aristotelian social theorising (such as Taylor’s work) and Adorno’s, Celikates denies that the 
notion of basic human functioning places any explanatory role in, for example, Adorno’s 
writings on Anti-Semitism. Indeed, the later works resist ‘being subsumed under an account of 
“minimum conditions of basic human functioning”’ (p. 9). 
I cannot here do justice to the complex work on Anti-Semitism by Adorno (and 
Horkheimer), but let me briefly indicate how the idea of basic human functioning, contrary to 
what Celikates claims, is not just compatible with it, but, actually, plays a role in it. To be clear: 
I am not saying that Adorno actually used the terms ‘minimal human functioning’ or the like. 
My point is that the logic of his position is such that we make best sense of it in these terms.  
Let’s concentrate here on ‘Elements of Anti-Semitism’. Already in the first section, we 
can read how Adorno and Horkheimer claim that Anti-Semitism is not a break with modern 
society, but reveals its truth, that is, it reveals the truth that modern society cannot exist ‘without 
disfiguring human beings [Entstellung der Menschen]’.19 Here, like elsewhere, Adorno 
operates with an emphatic notion of (yet-to-be-realized) humanity, which he thinks our social 
world denies – as I have argued in my book (APP, Chapter 9), this has clear affinities with 
Aristotelian conceptions of normativity and, indeed, makes best sense as one of them. One 
might think, however, that talk of inhumanity could also be captured differently, so the 
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 See also Freyenhagen 2017.  
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 Horkheimer and Adorno 1969: 178/2002: 139. 
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statement might only be compatible with ‘an Aristotelian twist’ (Celikates, p. 8), but not more 
than that. Clearer evidence is provided in the sixth section: here the two authors argue that 
Anti-Semitism involves, indeed is based on, ‘false projection’.20 This is contrasted with the 
normal level of projection that, they claim, is part of any perception. In effect, we get here an 
account of one of the elements of what minimal human functioning involves: in order to 
navigate the world successfully and survive, we need to engage in projection – the thought 
seems to be that anticipating how the world might pan out and projecting possibilities onto it, 
is a key abilities of higher animals to secure their food and avoid dangers. At the same time, 
projection should never become total, such that we become completely immune to any 
counterevidence the world provides. Whatever the human good is, we need the ability to project 
and we need to be placed and encultured in such a way that we make appropriate use of it. 
Paranoia as mental illness and Anti-Semitism as a social phenomenon share, according to 
Adorno and Horkheimer, the deformation of this basic human functioning. They do so, 
however, for different reasons: in one case, mental illness; in the other, certain social and 
political contexts which led to a deformation of the ability of projection and deny our being in 
a position to use it appropriately. Adorno and Horkheimer do not tell the story in the mental 
illness case; and their story in the latter case is complex and controversial (consisting, basically 
in a socially induced and politically promoted loss of keeping projection in check by way of 
reflexion and/or imagination). My point here is that basic human functioning is part of it.  
 
V: Co-option 
Celikates’ third and final point is not about interpreting Adorno, but whether Adorno is right 
that co-option in our wrong social world is unavoidable. While Celikates recognises the risks 
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that Adorno points to as ‘real’ (p. 11), he thinks that Adorno overlooks that social struggles 
and movements have developed strategies to counter or at least minimise these risks. Celikates 
makes the customary points that perhaps the historical situation has changed from when 
Adorno wrote and that, anyway, it is worrisome to ascribe ‘a lack of autonomy to oppressed 
groups and those who act in solidarity with them’. These considerations culminate in a 
powerful passage by Cornelius Castoriadis, where he insists that the constant worry about co-
option means one has become co-opted oneself; and that there is one thing that cannot be co-
opted, ‘our own reflective, critical, autonomous activity’ (quoted on p. 12).    
This is also a too big topic to address adequately here. And I am not even sure that I 
would myself agree with Adorno on this matter. What I can do here is to express doubts about 
the alternative that Castoriadis and, indirectly, Celikates present. First an important 
clarification: in the book, I distinguish between negative freedom to resist, on the one hand, 
and autonomy, on the other (APP, Chapters 2-3). My Adorno does not deny that we have, at 
least on occasion, the negative freedom to resist. Moreover, his notion of autonomy is different 
from the notion of autonomy used by liberal theorists to fix the boundary between those who 
get the full range of liberal individual rights and those who do not. By denying that anyone has 
or could have autonomy in this social world, Adorno is not proposing to deprive the oppressed 
of rights or saying that we should treat them paternalistically or in an elitist fashion ascribing 
something to him which he denies them. For that reason, it is not worrisome to ascribe a lack 
of autonomy to the oppressed (and those in solidarity with them). It is worrisome that we all 
lack autonomy (if indeed Adorno’s social theory is correct that we do lack it, that is, that we 
lack the ability to live a self-determined life and the genuine possibility to exercise this ability). 
Perhaps, there is something particularly pernicious in its being denied to the oppressed. But 
none of the normal reasons to specifically worry about the lack of autonomy of the oppressed 
applies. Adorno might be wrong in his analysis, but if he is right, then it would be to shoot the 
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messenger to fault him for denying that the oppressed have autonomy. It is unclear how we 
could be harmed by refusing to ascribe to us what we do not have in the first place. 
Second, I think one of the most interesting aspects of Adorno’s theory – whether one 
agrees with him in the final analysis – is his challenge to the idea that autonomy as an inner 
citadel that is somehow unscratched and cannot be touched by the delusions, repression, and 
ideologies our modern social world generates. The way he proposes to detect heteronomy at 
the heart of (what is commonly thought to be) autonomy should at least make one think twice 
before declaring autonomy a nature reserve untouchable by even the subtlest forms of social 
control. 
Finally, as powerful as Castoriadis rhetoric comes across, there are a number of 
problems with his statement. Why would someone who is afraid simply in virtue of this already 
be co-opted, rather than being extra vigilant and standing a better chance to resist co-option as 
much as possible? Castoriadis’s answer seems to be that seeking a guarantee against being co-
opted means co-opting has already reached in ‘the deepest reaches of [one’s] mind’ insofar as 
one ‘has already been caught in the trap of reactionary ideology: the search for an anti-cooption 
talisman or fetishistic magic charm’ (quoted on p. 12). But from being afraid about something’s 
coming to pass, it does not necessarily fellow that one seeks a guarantee against its happening 
– one can be aware that no such guarantee is available, and still be afraid about its coming to 
pass. Moreover, the passage seems to contain a central inconsistency. Castoriadis, first, says 
that ‘There is no guarantee against cooption; in a sense everything can be coopted, and 
everything is one day or another’ (ibid.). But then claims later on that there is ‘one thing’ that 
cannot not be coopted: ‘our own reflective, critical, autonomous activity’ (ibid.). Isn’t 
Castoriadis turning autonomy here into the very thing he warned us against, an ‘anti-cooption 
talisman or fetishistic magic charm’? One might respond that no inconsistency is present here 
as the two statements are located at different levels – one at the level of contents (specific aims, 
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ideas, etc.); the other at the level of activity or capacity for activity. But, even so, why think 
that capacities or activities cannot be co-opted? Castoriadis faces a dilemma here. Either he 
falls back onto an inner citadel notion of autonomy (for example of the Kantian kind, whereby 
pure practical reason is incorruptible, available to us, and self-validating), but, like Adorno, he 
is normally sceptical of this notion, drawing (again like Adorno) on Freudian insights; or 
Castoriadis should admit that even the capacity and activity of self-reflection can be co-opted.  
For Adorno, there are no guarantees against co-option, not even reflectiveness itself. 
Whether or not Adorno’s dark worldview is right in the final analysis, we do better to at least 
remain alive to the possibility that the inner citadel can be taken too, rather than simply rule 
this out from the start. Heteronomy might come to reign in the realm of autonomy – letting 
Adorno speak to us anew about this, will be one of the most important reminders he can offer 
us.21 
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